Although research on moral competence is still relatively new, we already know a good deal about it and its significance for democratic life 7 . Certain relationships have been confirmed in numerous studies, as we show below. When this competence is less developed the citizens concerned are at a disadvantage in regard to participation in democratic decision-taking or are even completely excluded. Democracy itself also suffers from a lack of this competence among its citizens; it also suffers under an unequal distribution of the competence, as this leads to some citizens winning more influence than others over the process of political decision-taking. In a democracy the constitution guarantees every citizen a say in the political process. And a civil society can only function properly if every citizen actually makes use of his/her voice in the proceedings and is in a position to hear the opinions of others 8 .
What is moral competence?
Recently, the concept of -competence‖ has become very popular and debated, especially through international school tests like -PISA‖. The concept has been taken up in educational policy. -With the new educational plans (of 2004) a fundamental paradigm shift in the binding specifications for teaching at our schools will take place. Whereas the educational plans of earlier generations primarily determined what was to be taught, the new plans allege that school should stipulate the competencies that children and youths must acquire.‖ 9
However, in much of the literature the concept of competence is not clearly, if at all, defined. Often a variety of assumptions are made on the origin, development, promotion and relevance of -competencies‖ without saying what is actually meant by them 10 . As a result of this lack of clarity there is controversy among scientists on the concept of competence 11 ; and many practitioners have strong reservations against it, doubting that the replacement of the concept of subject knowledge (Fachwissen) through the concept of competence will improve the quality of the school system. Experts like Hans-Peter Klein, the biology educationist and chairman 7 An annotated list of publications can be found in the internet: http://www.uni-konstanz.de/agmoral 8 Piaget (1973) ; Nussbaum (2006) ; Sen (2010) ; Roth (2010) ; Lind et al. (2010) : Nowak & Lind (2009) 
9 http://www.bildung-staerkt-menschen. de/schule_2004/bildungsplan_kurz (15.8.2011) 10 See, inter alia, the observations of the KMK (Conference of Education Ministers) (2005) on the educational standards of the Conference of Education Ministers and the 260-page-long survey on the -promotion of social, moral and democratic competencies‖ (Becker, 2008) .
11 Klein (2010). of the society Bildung und Wissen (Education and Knowledge) fears even a decline in the level of education 12 . This problem also applies to the concept of moral and democratic education. There is a great deal of cloudiness as to what it means and to how its effects can be measured 13 . Competencies are more than conscious subject knowledge, which can be verbalized. They include also tacit knowledge, which we characterize in everyday life as emotional knowledge, gut feeling or emotional intelligence 14 . When we make important decisions we ultimately decide in accordance with our feelings, particularly when taking the decision is an urgent matter and we have little time available for reflection and the collection of information. Even when we have time we still listen first to our inner voice before making our choice. Our feelings enable us to make quick and sometimes even better decisions on both technical and moral questions than if we took the time for careful reflection 15 .
However, conscious reasoning and subject knowledge are also important for democratic life. Reason is not just the wagging tail of emotions, as some psychologists seem to believe 16 . We depend on them for at least two reasons. First, we need them when our feelings fail us, for example when they suggest contradictory decisions (i.e. when we are in a dilemma), when they are ambiguous or when we are about to do something which brings our moral sense into play. In the shape of (self-)critical thinking it prevents us from doing or saying everything that occurs to us spontaneously or what we are ordered to do by others 17 . Second, reason and conscious reflection have the important task to shape and educate our feelings so that our feelings allow us to make the right decisions when we need them, especially when we are under pressure to decide quickly 18 . A sportsman, for example a javelin thrower, can train his emotional reactions so perfectly that he intuitively makes the right decision when he throws the javelin. At this moment reflection would tend to disturb him. But he would have no chance to throw well, if 12 Lind (2004b; 2004c; 2011c) . 13 A few authors touch on the question of how moral-democratic competence can be defined and validly measured (Tiedemann, 2011) . But most authors do not even mention this problem (see, e.g., Becker, 2008; KMK, 2009) 14 Goleman (1996) . In schools both competencies are mostly again reduced to conscious conceptual knowledge, which has to be acquired, just as practice often only means theory of practice and not practice itself.
15 Gigerenzer (2008) . 16 Haidt (2001) . 17 Achtziger et al. (2010) . 18 Lind (1989a) . Even undesired emotional reactions such as prejudice can disappear when the feelings responsible for them are given the opportunity to develop further. (Wasel, 1996) . he and his trainer had not continuously reflected on ways of improving his throwing technique by means of suitable exercises.
The situation is similar in the moral sphere. We also make moral decisions mostly in accordance with our feelings 19 . Moral feelings allow us to decide quickly and to act resolutely. But here too feelings can be deceptive or place us on the horns of a dilemma, so that conscious moral thinking is called for in order to correct moral gut feelings. Conscious, professionally schooled thinking is also necessary in order to train our moral feelings. Just as the javelin thrower needs an elaborate training program in order to be able to rely in the decisive moment on his feelings about his movements, so must we also develop and shape our moral feelings so that we can rely on them when we have to make quick decisions. Just as the development of sporting skills requires a trainer and other professional helpers, so too the development of moraldemocratic competencies (virtues in the Socratic sense) needs the help of competent helpers, that is, of parents, good friends and, above all, teachers. As research has shown, biological age alone has just as little effect as genetic disposition 20 . Opportunities must be provided for the assumption of responsibility and also guided reflection, in order to develop these competencies 21 .
Moral-democratic competence is indispensible for mastering life in a democratic society and, to cope with the tasks and problems we encounter in our personal surroundings (family, friends, neighbors, etc.), professions and public life. We can never know precisely which tasks life in general and the private lives of each and every one of us will bring. Therefore, subject knowledge alone cannot achieve to do this, not only because it quickly becomes obsolete in our day and age, but, above all, because our decisions and our well-being in everyday life depend not only on concepts and theories, but also on our moral feelings.
Two moral-democratic core competencies are particularly important: firstly the moral capacity of all citizens to judge and act in accordance with their own moral principles 22 and, secondly, the moral capacity to solve conflicts by means of fearfree dialogues instead of by violence or the exercise of power 23 . -The moral solution of conflicts of action excludes the manifest employment of force as well as ‗cheap' compromises; it can be understood as a continuation of communicative action - 19 Moll et al., (2002); Haidt (2003) ; Prehn et al. (2008) . 20 Lind (2002) ; . 21 Lind (2000; 2002) ; Schillinger (2006) ; Lupu (2009); Saeidi (2010) . 22 -The capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based on internal principles) and to act in accordance with such judgments" (Kohlberg, 1964, p. 425) 23 Habermas (1983) ; Apel (1990) ; Lind (1987; 2006b; 2011c; Sen (2010) .
that is action oriented to reaching understanding -with discursive means‖ 24 . In order to overcome violence and war, the Dalai Lama states, we need -a century of dialogue‖ 25 .
On the measurement of moral judgmental and discourse competence
If we want to test any assumption about the nature of moral competence or about the efficacy of certain teaching methods, we need to be able to measure it.
Otherwise, all our assumptions are solely unproven beliefs and the effects of moral education are uncertain. This is easier said than done. A person's moral competence is obviously more difficult to measure than his or her knowledge of moral norms and duties. We can rather easily find out which moral rules schoolchildren know or don't know. But it is much more difficult (and sometimes even impossible) to grasp directly their ability to behave in a moral way. On the one hand, many competencies -such as for example the ability to take on responsibility -elude detection, as they only manifest themselves in real situations later in life. Only when one is really responsible for something is it possible to show how capable one is of bearing this responsibility.
Or the competence can only be revealed in forms of behavior which can only be observed in serious situations, but these cannot, for ethical and practical reasons, be subjected to testing and control. It is true that in the past experiments have been carried out to test the ability of students to resist the temptation to violate a rule or to break a law 26 . But such experiments are controversial for ethical reasons (they involved immoral tasks as deception themselves) as well as for scientific reasons, as in these experiments one does not measure the participants' moral functioning but the conformity of isolated acts to external standards. 27 An even greater problem, however, is perhaps that the measurement of competencies requires a precise knowledge of their nature, which we do not have in many areas, and experimental diagnostic techniques whose development calls for creativity, time and money 28 . Attempts to ignore these preconditions and, 24 Habermas (1983) , p. 74.
25 Focus, 13.4.2011 , http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/seattle-dalai-lama-will-jahrhundert-desdialogs_aid_294793.html. (12.9.11) 26 Hartshorne & May (1928) . 27 Pittel & Mendelsohn (1966) . See also the insightful reflection by some of the most prominent experimenters in this field, namely Hartshorne and May (1928) : -It is not the quality of the isolated act which distinguishes the good man from the bad, but the quality of the man as an organized and socially functioning self" (p. 413 -the very last sentence of the book).
instead, to come to grips with the competencies by means of subjective personal assessments and indirect indicators can lead to serious misjudgments and wrong measures in educational policy even when the collection of such data is -backed up‖ by test statistics 29 .
Because of these difficulties, the measurement of moral and discourse competence has only been thematized in science during the last few decades. Until a few years ago there were no instruments for the measurement of competencies in these areas.
One had to be satisfied instead with the assessments of experts and teachers. But this was not a satisfactory solution as the criteria for these assessments remain obscure. Psychological research has provided numerous proofs that such assessments are strongly influenced by the -overall impression‖ of the test subjects or the belief in certain theories. Another approach was to measure moral competence by the behavior of people in accordance with external standards. This however, only measured norm conformity and not the ability of people to judge and act in conformity with their own moral principles 30 . The earliest scientific endeavors to find an adequate way of measuring moral competence, for example those undertaken by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, were based on interviews which were assessed by researchers on the basis of carefully chosen coding instructions. These assessments are often very elaborate and time-consuming and still not free of distortion in favor of the theories of the scientists involved 31 .
In order to provide a valid instrument for research and program evaluation, 35 years ago we, a group of researchers at the University of Konstanz, developed the first objective test for the measurement of moral-democratic competence, the Moral Judgment Test (MJT; Lind, 1978) . The MJT can be objectively evaluated. Completion and evaluation require only little time, so it is also well-suited for testing the effectiveness of teaching methods. We have also developed a convenient online version which has been frequently used. It is time-saving and inexpensive and hence suitable for self-evaluation of lessons by teachers, especially as it only involves a small amount of additional work. In the meantime the MJT has been translated into almost 40 languages and is used world-wide in research and efficacy studies 32 . subject to further research and consequently a new experimental measurement method had to be developed. (Lind, 1978; 1982; 2002; 2004b; 2008c; Weiß & Zierer, 2010) . 29 Linn (2000); Amrein & Berliner (2002) ; Jahnke & Meyerhöfer (2006); Lind (2004c; 2011c) . 30 Pittel & Mendelsohn (1966) . 31 Lind (1989b) . 32 Lind (1978; 2008c) .
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The MJT is not a test in the customary sense. It is a multivariate behavior experiment in the form of a questionnaire. Whereas in the customary tests an attempt is made to minimize individual features (so-called structural characteristics) by treating them as -measurement errors‖ and thus failing to take them into account, in experimental questionnaires it is precisely the structural differences in individual behavior which are of central importance 33 . In the MJT the participants have to evaluate the decision of the protagonists in dilemma stories and the arguments for and against their decisions (on a nine-point scale ranging from -I reject this completely‖ to -I entirely agree‖).
But the evaluation of their moral judgmental competence does not depend on -right‖ or -wrong‖ answers, or on the evaluation of the individual arguments. What counts is the overall answer pattern of the participant. Because of the special construction of the MJT it is possible to judge how strongly the subject based his assessments on the moral quality of the arguments presented and how strongly he took other aspects of the arguments into account, for example, how far the arguments corresponded to his own opinion on the case. We know from numerous studies that most people are guided in the assessment of arguments by -opinion conformity‖ (i.e. agree to all arguments which coincide with their own opinion and reject those which contradict their own opinion) and in controversial discussions are scarcely capable of judging arguments according to their moral quality. For democracy as discussion, i.e. for the solution of conflicts by means of peaceful, nonviolent discourse, it is indispensable that people are in a position to weigh up the arguments of opponents from a moral point of view instead of rejecting them lock, stock and barrel.
The MJT stands in contrast to approaches which attempt to assess moral competence by enquiring about attitudes and values, i.e. indirectly, and with other approaches in which action alternatives are given in dilemma situations, between which the subject has to choose. In the first case no valid measurement is possible, as what is measured is not a competence. The second approach is problematic in terms of the ethical aspects of research, as the researcher applies his own subjective standards on morality in the assessment of the test answers but does not measure whether the subject has been guided by his own moral standards. In his comprehensive study of the literature on the efficacy of teaching in philosophy and ethics, the ethics educationalist Markus Tiedemann comes consequently to the conclusion -that it has hitherto not been possible to assess ethical powers of judgments in an empirically satisfactory way‖ 34 . However, he excludes the MJT 33 Lind (1982; 2008a) . 34 Tiedemann (2011). explicitly from this verdict, as he had only learned about it after the completion of his study, and in fact regards it as an adequate approach 35 .
The significance of moral democratic competence for life in schools and civil society As many studies have shown, moral democratic competence plays a key role in the building and maintenance of civil society: It seems that the development of this competence plays an important part in cooperative, pro-social behavior and in the ability to deal with conflict and to make decisions 36 . It helps to prevent criminality 37 , drug consumption 38 and the use of violence 39 . According to the present state of research it can be expected that the promotion of moral competence among students (and teachers) is also directly beneficial for school learning 40 38 Lenz (2006); Lind (2011c) . 39 Seitz (1991); Lind (2002) . 40 Heidbrink (2010) . 41 Lind (2002; 2009a) . 42 Lind (2008a) . 43 Haan et al. (1968) ; Gross (1997) ; Lind et al. (2010) . 44 Further references on the studies cited here can be found in the internet: http://www.unikonstanz.de/ag-moral/mut/mjt-references.htm Whether and how far the school contributes or can contribute to the promotion of moral competence is, however, a controversial question. Often it is not even asked at all. Although many new teaching methods have found their way into teaching, some authors deny that the school can have any promotional effect on moral judgmental and discourse competence 47 . As we know from many studies, it is a fact that the measurable progress in moral judgmental and discourse competence is much smaller and less sustainable than it could be 48 . Students seldom have the opportunity to accept responsibility for their actions and to experience a democratic, respectful discussion on controversial topics 49 . In this respect there is a substantial need in our schools (and not only there) to catch up 50 . As we have seen, we do not need to mediate any values 51 to people -most if not all people have basic moral values. We must, however, help them to apply these values in daily life and to develop the skill they need, i.e. moral competence. In the past the teaching of democracy (political and civic education studies) and ethics was mostly restricted to the mediation of conceptual knowledge, i.e. to declarative knowledge of laws, theories and institutions. This education limited to verbal knowledge of democratic ideals is not sufficient, as we have been warned by Gustav Radbruch, a philosopher of law who has substantially and sustainably influenced our modern legal system. According to Radbruch the school must make it possible for students to experience democracy -not only democracy as a form of government with its institutions but also, and above all, democracy as a form of life and as discussion. Enabling students to experience self-determination and moral-democratic ways of dealing with others in an atmosphere free of compulsion and fear is one of the core tasks of education in and for democracy. In the teaching of politics and ethics attempts have, therefore, been made in recent years to overcome the restriction of the curricula in these subjects to the learning of the knowledge in books. Procedural action knowledge -which was previously ignored -and the emotional affective side of moral democratic behavior are being increasingly emphasized.
In this context there are two very different approaches to making democracy experiencable, namely in relation to democracy as a governmental form and to 48 Lind (2002; 2009a; 2009b) . 49 In KMDD lessons I regularly ask students whether they have discussed important problems with others (parents, teachers, friends etc.) in the way we had just discussed them, but I usually receive only few positive answers. A teacher who was present at a lesson at first expressed doubts about the answers of the student but after a pause for thought she admitted that the discussions normally took a completely different course. 50 Lind (2006b) . 51 The concept of -value‖ is ambiguous. It not only means moral basic values or moral principles, as is the case here, but also a variety of attitudes and opinions which are clearly private or culture-specific in nature and which are protected by the democratic basic law of freedom of opinion and conscience from state interference. This distinction is very important and must also be respected by schools. We must guard against mediating basic values to people who already possess them, and private and cultural values in areas over which the state has no rights. But even when effects were recognized they could not be clearly attributed to the democratization of the school, as dilemma discussions were also carried out at the same time in all of these projects. As we know how effective dilemma discussions are, the possibility cannot be excluded that these led to the increase in test values and not so much the Just Community program.
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This sobering realization has led me to rethink fundamentally the previous approaches to moral-democratic education. In view of the ineffectiveness of many of these approaches I have become convinced that democracy as a life form can be achieved more quickly and effectively in schools and society if one takes the individual as the starting point and undertakes fitting means to promote moral competence directly. According to everything we know, fundamental trust in democracy as a life form arises in young people (and adults): a) when they deal respectfully with each other and can practice and experience a discursive, non-violent solution of problems; b) when they experience themselves as enjoying equal rights and see that their opinion counts just as much as anyone else's and that power and status do not decide on access to information. 55 Power et al. (1989); Oser & Althof (1994); Lind (2002;  56 Higgins (1980) , p. 106. 57 "The results indicated a modest developmental change only in the two democratic high schools with teaching staffs explicitly committed to the just community approach" (Power et al., 1989, S. 297) . 58 Power et al. (1989) , p. 279. 59 Lind & Raschert (1986) ; Oser & Althof (1994); Lind (2002) . 60 Lind (2002), p. 180.
Being able to experience these things is a question of the opportunity offered to young people and of their individual ability to grasp and use this opportunity. It is, therefore, very important for the effectiveness of teaching that the opportunities provided for moral-democratic learning are well adjusted to the individual abilities.
Precisely this is achieved by the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion, which we developed over the past twenty years.
The promotion of moral competence with the Konstanz Method of
The main aim of the KMDD is the promotion of moral-democratic competence. Put simply this means the furtherance of the ability to stand up for one's own point of view and of the capacity to listen to others when important issues are at stake, important to oneself or to another person. This also means the ability to look for and to maintain communication with others when strong moral feelings are involved on both sides. This competence is fundamental for the individual ability to solve problems and conflicts under pressure, to make decisions, to learn from experience and, above all, to cooperate with other people and to be a productive member of civil society (see below). As research has shown, the existing degree of this competence differs from person to person. In most people it is only weakly developed. They find it very difficult to engage in a dialogue with others when their counterpart expresses a different opinion or presents himself as an opponent 61 . This competence does not develop simply as a result of biological maturation and growing older, or under pressure from the social milieu, but evidently only when certain learning opportunities are given or society (in the shape of its educational institutions) provides such learning opportunities, either intentionally or by chance 62 .
It is not only difficult to measure competencies but also to further them in a purposeful manner, as their promotion cannot be restricted to the transmission of subject knowledge but must involve applying this knowledge and taking on responsibility for the validity of this knowledge, as well as feelings and real experience. Competencies can only be acquired by active doing (Dewey) . As with competence in general the difficulty in mediating moral competence consists in developing suitable tasks and exercise types which encourage students to act in a moral-democratic way. A further problem with moral-democratic educational aims is that the teaching methods (the active doing of the teacher) must be in keeping 61 Keasey (1974); Habermas (1983); Lind (2002) . 62 Rest & Thomas ( with these aims. Self-determination cannot be taught with compulsory methods 63 .
The ability to behave in accordance with inner moral principles cannot be tested by external standards. The active doing of learners should not be prevented by excessive activity on the part of the teacher.
The KMDD has similarities with vaccination against virus infections. Just as in the case of vaccination, when the organism is confronted with real but weakened viruses in order to stimulate its ability to survive an actual virus attack, so too in the KMDD the students are confronted for learning purposes with the task of entering into a moral discourse on a moral dilemma with different-minded students and of giving arguments to convince them of their own opinion on the dilemma.
Alternating phases of support and challenge during a 90-minute KMDD session ensure that the moral feelings of the participants evoked by the controversy are kept within an optimal range. To this end special -educative‖ dilemmas have been constructed for KMDD sessions which are highly realistic in form and deal with controversial topics, but have fictive persons as their protagonists. KMDD sessions have only two rules: firstly, the participants can say everything they wish (except for making value judgments on others); secondly, the participants call upon one another to make contributions, i.e. there is no discussion leader or moderator.
Violations of the first rule very rarely occur, but they are more frequent in the case of the second rule. In my year-long experience with various age groups, school types and cultures, I have found that it is sufficient, when violations occur, to remind the participants in a friendly way of the rule in order to guarantee its observation. This experience strengthens the assumption that the rules of the KMDD do in fact correspond to the moral feelings of most, if not of all people. The participants make the experience that all the students and also all the teachers are subject to the authority of rules instead of the power of certain persons, in accordance with the moral ideal of the -equal dignity‖ 64 of all people, and that they do this freely and gladly without their being any need for punishment or reward. Participants also report that in KMDD sessions they have learned to esteem people with other opinions as important and useful sources of inspiration for their own development, and not merely to tolerate them.
The KMDD method can be traced back to the work of Blatt and Kohlberg 65 . This method became popular in Germany as a result of the school project Demokratie 63 Portele (1978) fittingly calls this the -You ought-to-want-to paradox‖. 64 Juul (1997) . 65 See Reinhardt, S. (1980); Lind & Lind (1984) , Lind (1987; 1989a; 1993) ; Lind & Raschert (1987) . The KMDD is one of the few educational methods whose efficacy has been scientifically tested by means of intervention studies with before-and-after investigations and comparative analyses. It has been shown that the moraldemocratic competence of people can be very effectively promoted with the KMDD method: Even after only a few KMDD lessons the recorded effect size is far higher than the customary effect sizes (r > 0.5 bzw. d > 1.20) 70 . In addition, numerous 66 Lind, G. & Raschert, J. (1987) . Lind, G. (1993; 2004a; 2008a) . Oser, F. & Althof, W. (1994) . 67 Lind (1994; 2002; 2009a) . 68 For an introduction see: Lind, G. (2009) . -Moral ist lehrbar -Handbuch zur Theorie und Praxis moralischer und demokratischer Bildung.‖ München: Oldenbourg (2. edn.) 69 The phenomenon of the -hidden curriculum‖ referred to by Jackson (1967) . 70 The effect sizes are far greater than the values of other methods. A value of r = 0.3 is regarded by some as a threshold. On the conception and evaluation of the KMDD see http://www.unikonstanz.de/ag-moral/moral/kmdd-references.htm reports of participants are available in the internet which give an impression of the acceptance and confirmed effectiveness of the KMDD 71 .
The KMDD is well received by the participants not only because students usually enjoy discussing and because these sessions bring variety into everyday life at school. The students are also very much impressed by the good discussion culture.
-We could really argue about something without it immediately becoming personal and causing aggression, as it usually does‖ was the judgment of a ten-year-old girl.
Many participants judge their experience with KMDD lessons in a similar way. A number of media reports and video documentations on the KMDD exist 72 .
The KMDD has the following characteristics:
-It can be employed in all subjects and also in interdisciplinary teaching; -Its efficacy is continuously self-evaluated with anonymous before-and-after tests It can often be observed that teachers who use the KMDD change their entire behavior in their teaching. It seems that the KMDD -rubs off‖. This is a thoroughly desirable effect of the KMDD. The KMDD can be used in all school types (from grade three onwards) and also in other non-school educational institutions, at home and abroad 75 .
Conclusion
Democracy is a high moral ideal of most people worldwide. Regardless of culture, religion, age, social class, gender etc., most if not all people have high moral ideals and principles. But we also know that these are not sufficient in view of the complexity of everyday life for people to make decisions which accord with these ideals in every situation. To this end we have to develop a special ability which we have characterized here as moral competence. As the research shows, this competence can scarcely develop of its own accord, but requires encouragement by the institutions of society -parents, siblings, friends, media etc. and especially by the schools. The Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion provides schools with a method with which they can promote moral-democratic competence very effectively and which can be easily integrated into the curriculum of all subjects. In order to be effective, however, this method requires a thorough training in its use 76 .
